Publications

(7) Evidentially Hedged Assertions and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion. Erkenntnis, Forthcoming. [Penultimate Version]

Speakers perform evidentially hedged assertions when they weaken commitment to the truth of what they assert by disclosing imperfectly reliable sources of evidence. In this paper, I ask whether linguistic data on evidentially hedged assertions support the knowledge norm of assertion, and I provide a broadly negative answer.

(6) Hedged Conjunctions and Norms of Assertion. Inquiry, Forthcoming. [Penultimate Version]

Speakers hedge appropriately when they self-disavow knowledge and inappropriately when they self-attribute it. Does this linguistic evidence support the knowledge norm of assertion? While the answer initially seems to be 'yes', I argue that the picture is more complicated.

(5) Epistemic Justification and the Folk Conceptual Gap. Episteme, 2024. [Link to Published Version, Open Access]

Empirical surveys of folk attributions of epistemic justification are taking center stage in experimental epistemology. First, I point out a few hitherto unappreciated limitations of these surveys. Then, I sketch a way forward.

(4) Etiological Proper Function and the Safety Condition. Synthese, 2023. [Link to Published Version, Open Access]

Safety-theoretic accounts of knowledge face a number of pressing counterexamples. I show that etiological proper functionalism can help to address them.

(3) Knowledge, Individualised Evidence and Luck. Philosophical Studies, 2022. [Link to Published Version, Open Access]

For a long time, philosophers of evidence law have grappled with the difficulties of defining the notion of individualised evidence. Epistemologists have recently stepped in to help and noted a connection between individualised evidence and anti-luck conditions on knowledge. I cast doubt on the significance of this connection.

(2) The Explanationist and the Modalist. Episteme, 2022. [Link to Published Version, Open Access]

Explanationists urge us to break with tradition and abandon modal theories of knowledge. After assessing the prospects of explanationism, I conclude that we should stick with tradition.

(1) A New Solution to the Safety Dilemma. Synthese, 2022. [Link to Published Version, Open Access]

The safety dilemma raises a difficult challenge for standard safety-theoretic accounts of knowledge. I develop a version of safety that escapes the dilemma.




Work in Progress